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Summary. If the payos of a game are ane, then they are additively coupled. In this
situation both the Weierstrass theorem and the Bauer maximum principle can be used
to produce existence results for a Nash equilibrium, since each player is faced with an in-
dividual, independent optimization problem. We consider two instances in the literature
where these simple observations immediately lead to substantial generalizations.
1 Nash equilibria for additively coupled payos
Let , := f(S
i
; 
i
)g
m
i=1
denote a game in normal form with m players; S
i
, a topological space, is
the strategy set and 
i
: S ! R the payo of player i 2 I := f1;    ;mg. A strategy vector
s := (s
1
;    ; s
m
) in S := 
m
j=1
S
j
is called a Nash equilibrium for , if for each i 2 I

i
(s)  
i
(s
 i
; s
i
) for all s
i
2 S
i
: (1)
Here (s
 i
; s
i
) is the usual notation for the strategy vector whose j-th component is s
j
for j 6= i and
s
i
for j = i; corresponding notation for product sets is S
 i
:= 
j 6=i
S
j
, etc.
Although the existence problem for Nash equilibria is in general quite nontrivial, a much simpler
problem is encountered when the payos are additively coupled in the following sense: for each i 2 I
there are component functions 
i;j
: S
j
! R, j 2 I, such that 
i
decomposes as follows:

i
(s
1
;    ; s
m
) =
m
X
j=1

i;j
(s
j
): (2)
The following proposition is a trivial consequence of (1) and (2):
Proposition 1.1 Let the payos of , be additively coupled as in (2). Then (s
1
;    ; s
m
) 2 S is a
Nash equilibrium in the sense of (1) if and only if for each i 2 I

i;i
(s
i
) = sup
s
i
2S
i

i;i
(s
i
):
The following two existence results are an immediate consequence of combining Proposition 1.1
with the Weierstrass theorem and the Bauer maximum principle respectively. Observe that these
games need only have payos that are semicontinuous in one variable. Games with discontinuous
payos have been a subject of increasing interest in the recent past; e.g., cf. [3, 6].
Corollary 1.2 Let the payos of , be additively coupled as in (2) and let each S
i
, i 2 I, be equipped
with a topology. If for each i 2 I
S
i
is compact,

i;i
is upper semicontinuous,
then there exists a Nash equilibrium for ,.
Proof. By the Weierstrass theorem the maximumof 
i;i
over S
i
is attained for each i 2 I. Apply
Proposition 1.1. Q.E.D.
Corollary 1.3 Let the payos of , be additively coupled as in (2) and let each S
i
, i 2 I, be a subset
of a Hausdor locally convex topological vector space. If for each i 2 I
S
i
is compact and convex,

i;i
is upper semicontinuous and convex on S
i
,
then there exists a Nash equilibrium (s
1
;    ; s
m
) 2 S for , such that for each i 2 I
s
i
is an extreme point of S
i
.
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Proof. By the Bauer maximum principle [5, Theorem 25.9] the maximum of 
i;i
over S
i
is
attained at some extreme point of S
i
for each i 2 I. Apply Proposition 1.1. Q.E.D.
The next existence result is essentially contained in Corollary 1.3; it forms a solution to a question
posed to the author by N. Yannelis. Compared to Corollary 1.3, the only new aspect which is oered
is the realization that additive coupledness is an inherent aspect of anity. While this is trivial in
nite dimensions, this aspect seems to have been overlooked in some innite-dimensional situations
in the literature.
Corollary 1.4 Let each S
i
, i 2 I, be a subset of a Hausdor locally convex topological vector space.
If for each i 2 I
S
i
is compact and convex,

i
is ane on S = 
m
j=1
S
j
,

i
(s
 i
; ) is upper semicontinuous on S
i
for each s
 i
2 S
 i
,
then there exists a Nash equilibrium (s
1
;    ; s
m
) 2 S for , such that for each i 2 I
s
i
is an extreme point of S
i
.
Proof. It is enough to demonstrate that the situation of Corollary 1.3 obtains. Let ~s =
(~s
1
;    ; ~s
m
) be an arbitrary xed element of S. Fix i 2 I; we show that 
i
is additively coupled as
in (2) by dening functions 
i;j
: S
j
! R as follows:

i;j
(s
j
) := 
i
(~s
 j
; s
j
)  
m   1
m

i
(~s):
Indeed, anity of 
i
gives
m
X
j=1
1
m

i;j
(s
j
) = 
i
(
m   1
m
~s +
1
m
s)  
m   1
m

i
(~s) =
1
m

i
(s);
which directly implies (2). The remaining conditions of Corollary 1.3 are easily seen to be implied
by the above denition of the 
i;j
's. Q.E.D.
2 Applications
Two applications of Corollary 1.4 will be discussed briey. The rst of these extends a pure strategy
equilibrium existence result of Yannelis and Rustichini [15, Theorem 5.2]. The second application
extends a Nash equilibrium existence result in original controls of Parthasarathy and Raghavan [12,
Theorem 2] for a dierential game with relaxed control functions.
2.1 Application to a Bayesian game [15]
The following model is considered by Yannelis and Rustichini [15]. Let (
; T ; P ) be a probability
space. Consider m sub--algebras S
1
;    ;S
m
of T ; here S
i
represents the way in which player i 2 I
observes the uncertain state of the world as modelled by the probability space. Upon learning about
the state of the world, players can take actions in a separable Banach space (Y; k  k), the action
space. The actions of each player i 2 I are restricted by means of a given multifunctionX
i
: 
! 2
Y
that is supposed to be S
i
-measurable, i = 1;    ;m. Namely, the strategy set S
i
for player i 2 I
consists of all S
i
-measurable functions x
i
: 
! Y such that
x
i
(!) 2 X
i
(!) for P -a.e. ! in 
:
We shall write X(!) := 
m
i=1
X
i
(!). The expected payo for player i 2 I is
p
i
(x
1
;    ;x
m
) :=
Z


u
i
(!;x
1
(!);    ;x
m
(!))P (d!);
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assuming that the integral exists. Here u
i
: 
Y
m
! R is the utility function of player i, supposed
to be \
m
i=1
S
i
 B(Y
m
)-measurable, with B(Y
m
) = (B(Y ))
m
denoting the Borel -algebra on Y
m
.
Theorem 2.1 Suppose that for each i 2 I and for a.e. ! 2 

X
i
(!) is nonempty, (Y; Y

)-compact and convex;
u
i
(!; ) is ane on X(!);
u
i
(!; x
 i
; ) is (Y; Y

)-upper semicontinuous on X
i
(!) for every x
 i
2 
j 6=i
X
j
(!):
Suppose also that for each i 2 I there exist integrable 
i
,  
i
: 
! R
+
with
sup
x
i
2X
i
(!)
kx
i
k  
i
(!) for a.e. ! 2 
;
sup
x2X(!)
ju
i
(!; x)j   
i
(!) for a.e. ! 2 
:
Then there exists a Nash equilibrium (
~
x
1
;    ;
~
x
m
) for the game f(S
i
; p
i
)g
m
i=1
such that for each i 2 I
~
x
i
(!) is an extreme point of X
i
(!) for a.e. ! 2 
.
This substantially generalizes Theorem 5.2 of [15], where additional conditions were imposed: there
(
; T ; P ) is complete and nonatomic and Y is nite-dimensional.
Below we prove Theorem 2.1 by a straightforward application of Corollary 1.4. In view of the
generality aorded by that corollary, the actual model of [15] could now also be expanded. However,
we shall leave this aspect unexplored.
Let L
1
Y
be the vector space L
1
Y
(
; T ; P ) of all Bochner integrable (equivalence classes of) func-
tions x : 
! Y . For each i 2 I let S
i
be the corresponding quotient of S
i
in L
1
Y
. By the integrable
boundedness condition for the multifunctions X
i
and the inclusion S
i
 T , the sets S
1
;    ; S
m
are
contained in L
1
Y
. By [10, IV] we know that the dual space of L
1
Y
is (identiable with) the space
M of all (equivalence classes) of scalarly measurable functions z : 
 ! Y

which are essentially
bounded (here Y

denotes the dual of Y ). The duality between L
1
Y
and M is given by
 x; z :=
Z


< x(!); z(!) > P (d!):
By equipping L
1
Y
with the weak topology (L
1
Y
;M ), it is made into a Hausdor locally convex
topological vector space.
The following lemmas show that, with the above topology, Corollary 1.4 can be brought to bear
in the proof of Theorem 2.1:
Lemma 2.2 The hypotheses of Theorem 2.1 imply for each i 2 I the following:
(i) S
i
is nonempty, (L
1
Y
;M )-compact and convex,
(ii) p
i
is ane on S = 
m
j=1
S
j
,
(iii) p
i
(x
 i
; ) is ((L
1
Y
;M ))-upper semicontinuous on S
i
for each x
 i
2 S
 i
.
Proof. i. Nonemptiness of S
i
follows directly by the von Neuman-Aumann measurable selection
theorem [4, III.22], in view of the given measurability and other properties of the multifunctionsX
i
.
Weak compactness follows by a well-known result of Diestel [7] (see also [14]). Convexity is trivial.
ii. Trivial by linearity of the integral.
iii. Because p
i
(x
 i
; ) is ane, its upper semicontinuity in the topology (L
1
Y
;M ) is equivalent to
upper semicontinuity in the L
1
Y
-norm (Mazur's theorem). Such semicontinuity follows immediately
by Fatou's lemma and a well-known corollary of Egorov's theorem [11, II.4.3]. QED
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Lemma 2.3 For each i 2 I the set of extreme points of S
i
consists precisely of all equivalence
classes of functions x
i
in S
i
such that
x
i
(!) is an extreme point of X
i
(!) for a.e. ! 2 
. (3)
Proof. We reiterate well-known measurable selection arguments involving extreme points [4,
pp. 109-110]: First, observe that when x
i
2 S
i
has a representant x
i
with (3), then x
i
is trivially
extreme in S
i
. Conversely, suppose that x
i
2 S
i
is such that it has a a representant x
i
2 S
i
which
does not satisfy (3). Then there exists a set A 2 T , P (A) > 0, such that for every ! 2 A the set
(!) is nonempty, where
(!) := f(y; y
0
) 2 X
i
(!)
2
n :
1
2
(y + y
0
) = x
i
(!)g:
Here  := f(y; y
0
) 2 Y
2
: y 6= y
0
g. By elementary arguments [4, Lemma IV.10] it follows that the
graph of  is T B(Y
2
)-measurable. So by the von Neuman-Aumann measurable selection theorem
[4, III.22] it follows from the above that there exists a T -measurable mapping (x;x
0
) : A ! Y
2
such that (x(!);x
0
(!)) 2 (!) for a.e. !. Extend x and x
0
to all of 
 by setting them equal to x
i
both on the exceptional null set involved in the previous statement and on 
nA. Then it is easy to
verify that x, x
0
both belong to S
i
, that x
i
=
1
2
(x + x
0
), and that x and x
0
are essentially dierent
elements of S
i
. Therefore, x
i
is not an extreme element of S
i
. QED
Proof of Theorem 2.1. Lemma 2.2 allows us to apply Corollary 1.4. This gives the existence of
(x
1
;    ; x
m
) 2 S which is a Nash equilibrium for the game f(S
i
; p
i
)g
m
i=1
and satises
x
i
is an extreme point of S
i
, i 2 I:
Let

x
i
be any representant of the equivalence class x
i
, i 2 I. Since the values of the payos (which
we treated with some abuse of notation) are unaected by this return to the original prequotient
setting, (

x
1
;    ;

x
m
) is a Nash equilibrium for the game f(S
i
; p
i
)g
m
i=1
and satises for a.e. ! 2 


x
i
(!) is an extreme point of X
i
(!), i 2 I
by Lemma 2.3. Q.E.D.
2.2 Application to a dierential game [12]
In this section we briey sketch an application of Corollary 1.4 to a dierential game considered by
Parthasarathy and Raghavan in [12], which involves two players. The extension to m players would
be immediate, and there exist several other possibilities to generalize; however, we shall remain
within the model used in [12].
The two players are allowed to use relaxed control functions (i.e., mixing of the control action is
allowed { see [13] and [2] for the general background). For such games well-known counterexamples
[13, IX.2] are known to essentially restrict considerations to payos that are additively coupled in
the relaxed controls. This explains why Parthasarathy and Raghavan only study payos of the kind
P
i
(
1
; 
2
) := 
i
(y

1
;
2
) +
Z
1
0
[
Z
U
1
F
i
(t; u
1
)
1
(t)(du
1
)]dt+
Z
1
0
[
Z
U
2
G
i
(t; u
2
)
2
(t)(du
2
)]dt; i = 1; 2;
where [0; 1] is the time interval, F
i
and G
i
are continuous functions, U
i
is the space of control points
for player i, 
i
is a continuous linear functional on the set C[0; 1] of all continuous functions on [0; 1]
and y

1
;
2
is the solution of a dierential equation (equation (4) in [12]) that is semilinear and has
an additively coupled right-hand side. Since the 
i
's are linear, it follows that P
1
and P
2
are both
ane functions. Thus, it is not surprising that Corollary 1.4 turns out to apply to their model. The
extreme point properties in Corollary 1.4 imply here that the resulting Nash equilibrium is in original
(i.e., nonmixed) control functions, which is in agreement with [12, Theorem 2] (e.g., cf. [1]). The mild
conditions of Corollary 1.4 also present the possibility to relax some of the conditions immediately;
for instance, the continuity conditions for F
i
and G
i
can be substantially reduced: F
i
(t; u
1
) needs
only to be upper semicontinuous in u
1
, integrably bounded above and jointly measurable in (t; u
1
);
a similar observation applies to G
i
, i = 1; 2.
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3 Additional observations
A slightly more involved variant of Corollary 1.4 is as follows:
Proposition 3.1 Let each S
i
, i 2 I, be a subset of a Hausdor locally convex topological vector
space. If for each i 2 I
S
i
is compact and convex,

i
is concave on S = 
m
j=1
S
j
,

i
(; s
i
) is ane on S
 i
for every s
i
2 S
i
;

i
(s
 i
; ) is upper semicontinuous on S
i
for each s
 i
2 S
 i
,
then there exists a Nash equilibrium for ,.
Here the additional extreme point condition of Corollary 1.4 disappears for obvious reasons (e.g.,
consider the situation m = 1). The above result forms a natural transpose of a well-konwn version of
Glicksberg's Nash equilibrium existence result [9] by switching the roles of (i) upper semicontinuity
and (quasi)concavity, (ii) continuity and anity.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Dene the aggregate function q : S  S ! R as follows. For s
0
:=
(s
0
1
;    ; s
0
m
), s := (s
1
;    ; s
m
), set
q(s
0
; s) :=
m
X
i=1
[
i
(s
0
)  
i
(s
0 i
; s
i
)]:
Then we can easily see that for every s
0
; s 2 S, q(; s) is concave, q(s
0
; ) is lower semicontinuous and
q(s
0
; s
0
) = 0. Therefore, by Ky Fan's inequality [8, Theorem 5] there exists s 2 S such that
q(s
0
; s)  0 for all s
0
2 S:
By substitution of s
0
:= (s
 j
; s
j
), j 2 I, one sees that s constitutes a Nash equilibrium. QED
Acknowledgment. I wish to thank Nicholas Yannelis for posing a question which led me to writing
this note in its present form.
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